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A VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF
THE BENCH*
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON**
After serving on a jury, G.K. Chesterton wrote:
Many legalists have declared that the untrained jury should
be altogether supplanted by the trained judge .... The
Fabian argument of the expert, that the man who is trained
should be the man who is trusted would be absolutely unan-
swerable if it were really true that a man who studied a thing
and practised it every day went on seeing more and more of
its significance. But he does not. He goes on seeing less and
less of its significance ....
.... [T]he horrible thing about all legal officials, even the
best, about all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and
policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of them are
good), not that they are stupid (several of them are quite
intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to it ....
They do not see the awful court of judgment; they only see
their own workshop.1
My opportunity to see whether I had "got used to it" came
on July 2, 1984. In answer to a summons for jury duty,2 I
* This text was originally presented to the Madison Literary Club on December 10,
1984, and is on file with the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
It has been revised and annotated for publication. A companion piece Justice and
Juror, originally presented as the Edith House Lecture at the University of Georgia Law
School on March 7, 1985, is published in 20 Ga. L. Rev. 257 (1986). I wish to thank
Diana Balio, Carole Hinchcliff, and Sharon Ruhly for their assistance in preparing this
manuscript for publication.
** Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court.
1. G.K. CHESTERTON, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES, 54-56 (1968).
For jurors' writings about their experiences, see Hinchciff, Portrait of a Juror: A
Selected Bibliography, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 495 (1986).
2. The summons procedure is set forth in Wis. STAT. § 756.08 (1983-84).
The same jury procedures are used in criminal and civil cases. Wis. STAT. § 972.01
(1983-84) provides:
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was reporting to the second floor of the Dane County court-
house as Juror Number G-428. It was a Monday morning,
the first day of my "summer vacation;" the 1983-84 session of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, of which I am Justice Number
Three (in seniority), had ended the previous Friday.
I had been in these second floor corridors, courtrooms,
and anterooms many times before. I had been there first in
July, 1962, when I delivered some papers to Judge Bardwell-
the law firm that had recently hired me felt I could be trusted
with that job. Cynthia Fokakis, then Judge Bardwell's secre-
tary, was warm-hearted and friendly, showing me around the
courthouse and introducing me to the staff. Twenty-two years
later she was in charge as Clerk of Court, instructing staff and
jurors.
Since my trip to Judge Bardwell's chambers I had re-
turned to the second floor on numerous occasions-first from
my law office on my clients' matters and later from my cham-
bers in the Capitol, generally on ceremonial matters. On July
2, 1984, though, the courtroom, counsel table, bench, and jury
box looked different to me. I had never seen this place
through the eyes of a juror.
Even so, I felt I was a maven on juries. In 1981 when I
was writing a supreme court opinion on the Milwaukee
County jury selection process, 3 I had studied the history of
jury selection in Wisconsin. I knew that from 1849, shortly
after statehood, until 1978, the Wisconsin statutes exempted
many people from jury duty. Judges and lawyers were auto-
matically exempt, as were physicians, dentists, Christian Sci-
ence readers, ministers of the gospel, students who were
attending or who had attended law school or medical school,
and others.4 Furthermore, many people could be exempted
upon their own request or on the judge's own motion, namely:
all administrators, professors, instructors, and teachers of
public and private schools from primary grade to institutions
The summoning of jurors, the impaneling and qualifications of the jury, the
challenge of jurors for cause and the duty of the court in charging the jury and
giving instructions and discharging the jury when unable to agree shall be the
same in criminal as in civil actions, except that s. 805.08 (3) [peremptory chal-
lenges] shall not apply.
3. State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981).
4. Wis. STAT. § 255.02(1) (1975) (repealed 1977).
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of higher education; officers and employees of state and
county institutions; and persons over sixty-five years of age.
In addition to these exempt groups, a judge could excuse or
exclude from jury service any person or class of persons if jury
service would entail undue hardship or serious obstruction of
administration of justice.6
Democratization of the jury occurred in 1978 when the
Wisconsin legislature significantly revised the statutes.7  Fol-
lowing the recommendations of the American Bar Associa-
tion' and the Uniform Law Commission, 9 the legislature
eliminated the long list of excluded persons and broadened the
pool of jurors.10 Hereafter, jurors would be United States citi-
zens, electors of the state who are possessed of their natural
faculties and are not infirm, who are able to read and under-
stand the English language, and who have not been sum-
moned for jury service within the preceding two years.
5. Wis. STAT. § 255.02(2) (1975) (repealed 1977).
6. Wis. STAT. § 255.02(3) (1975) (repealed 1977). For the current statute, see Wis.
STAT. § 756.02(2) (a), infra note 18.
7. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 318, § 13.
8. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS § 2.11 (1976).
9. UNIF. JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT §§ 8, 10, 11, 13 U.L.A. 525, 528-531
(1980).
10. For a discussion of occupational exemptions, see Abrahamson, Justice and Ju-
ror, 20 GA. L. REv. 257, 274-76 (1986).
11. Wis. STAT. § 756.01 (1983-84). Section 756.01(2) discusses infirmity as
follows:
(2) Subsection (1) shall not exempt, exclude or disqualify a person from jury
service on the ground of infirmity because of a physical condition unless the
judge finds that the person clearly cannot fulfill the responsibilities of a juror.
The judge shall not consider the structural, physical or architectural limitations
or barriers of a building, courtroom, jury box or other facility in making such a
finding.
Sec. 756.02(2)(c) further provides:
(c) No citizen may be excluded from service as grand or petit juror in any
court of this state... because of a physical condition, except as provided in s.
756.01(2).
For discussions of blind and deaf-jurors, see Blind Jurors, NE-WSVEEK, Oct. 10,
1977, at 70; Comment, Jury Selection: The Courts, The Constitution, and the Deaf, 11
PAC. L.J. 967 (1980); Dupois, Courts Prepare for Deaf Jurors, U.P.I. 1983 (available
Dec. 18, 1985, on NEXIS, Newspapers file); Ranni, Blind Judge Backs Use of Deaf,
Blind Jurors, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 21, 1983, at 11, col. 1; State's First Deaf Juror Completes
Service, A.P. 1981 (available Jan. 26, 1986, on NEXIS, Newspapers file); California OKs
Deaf Jurors, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
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In the democratized system I had been selected for jury
duty by a computer that, when instructed by the jury commis-
sioners, 12 selects about 4000 names at random from the list of
registered voters in Dane County.1 3  To achieve a more
representative and balanced cross section of the population,
sometimes the driver's license list is used in lieu of the voter
list.
Each person initially selected by the computer receives a
one-page juror qualification questionnaire.14 Section A asks
for personal information - name, occupation, employer, age,
spouse's name, age of children, spouse's occupation and em-
ployer, address, telephone, sex, marital status, and the wo-
man's birth name. Section B of the questionnaire asks for
information about juror qualifications - citizenship, eligibil-
ity to vote, ability to read and understand English, prior jury
service, and disabilities preventing jury service. The question-
naire ends with a threat: "upon wilful misrepresentation of a
material fact, a fine of $500 may be imposed."' 5
The jury commissioners, three people chosen by the circuit
judges of Dane County, read the responses to the question-
naire and strike those persons who do not meet the statutory
qualifications. The commissioners do not disqualify anyone
for reasons of employment or inconvenience. According to
12. The jury commissioners and electronic automated systems are discussed in
Wis. STAT. §§ 756.03, 756.04, 756.27 (1983-84).
13. The National Center for Jury Studies reports that a perennial concern is the
prevention of citizens' withdrawal from the voters' list to avoid jury duty. The Center
suggests that education, improving jury service conditions (especially reducing the term
of service), and using multiple source lists would prevent citizens' withdrawal. The
motivation to protect "the voters' list was the impetus for the Nebraska Legislature to
require the use of the voters' and drivers' list as the source of prospective jurors'
names." 1985 NEB. LAWS LB 113 (adopted Mar. 20, 1985). See Center for Jury Stud-
ies News, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS REPORT, Dec. 1985, at 3.
"Is America's Jury System Working?" was the topic on The Larry King Show, a
nationally broadcast radio call-in program, on Jan. 17, 1986. One caller reported her
experience of having been excused from jury duty because of a heart condition but being
advised by a "jury coordinator" that "you must give up your right to vote. You know
that don't you?" The program moderator expressed horror and the guest experts as-
sured her that she had been misinformed.
14. The juror qualification form is discussed at Wis. STAT. § 756.04(2)(b) (1983-
84).
15. Juror Qualification Questionnaire, June, 1984 (available through Circuit Court,
Dane County Courthouse, Madison, WI 53709).
[Vol. 69:463
1986] VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BENCH 467
our court's interpretation of the statute in the Milwaukee case,
only the judge can make the latter disqualifications.' 6
From those persons determined to be qualified, the com-
puter randomly selects names for jury duty.1 7 My name was
one of those, and I was summoned to serve as a juror from
February 27 to March 23.
I had a problem. The 1978 statute provides that judges
and attorneys are the only people who can claim an exemption
from jury duty.18 On the one hand, I did not want to claim an
exemption. I had always wanted to serve on a jury. Besides,
according to jury folklore, business and professional people
who serve on juries set good examples for doing one's civic
duty. '9
Furthermore, there were precedents for Wisconsin judges
serving as jurors: Judge Ed Wilkie in Dane County, and
Judges Patricia Curley, Robert Miech, and Arlene Connors in
Milwaukee. Three justices of the Arizona Supreme Court had
served. 0
16. State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 206-08, 301 N.W.2d 221, 234-35 (1981).
17. This procedure is set forth in Wis. STAT. §§ 756.04(3), 756.27 (1983-84).
18. Wis. STAT. § 756.02(1) (1983-84). Wis. STAT. § 756.02(2)(b) also provides
that "[a] state legislator or full-time elected official shall be excused from service as a
juror if the official states to the court that jury service would interfere with the perform-
ance of his or her official duties."
A judge may exclude or excuse any person or group of persons for hardship under
Wis. STAT. § 756.02(2)(a), which provides:
Any person or group of persons may be excluded from the jury panel or
excused from service as jurors by order of the judge based on a finding that jury
service would entail undue hardship, extreme inconvenience or serious obstruc-
tion or delay in the fair and impartial administration ofjustice. The exclusion or
excuse shall continue for a period deemed necessary by the judge, at the conclu-
sion of which the person or group of persons shall reappear for jury service in
accordance with the order of the judge.
19. In 1960, Judge John R. Brown, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, agreed
to serve on the jury panel in the Texas state courts. He explained that his action was in
protest against the broad jury exemption and exclusion laws. He said:
I felt that perhaps my willingness to serve and to waive exemption might set
an example to others entitled to exemptions .... My purpose was primarily to
dramatize the ridiculous nature of statutory exemptions to jury service and to
demonstrate to busy, important people that they need not claim an exemption
otherwise open to them.
23 TEX. B.J. 54 (1960).
20. See Cameron, A Judge in the Jury Bo, Letter to the Editor, 64 JUDICATURE
386 (1981).
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On the other hand, I did have obligations in my own court
from September through June. The Wisconsin Constitution
does not allow for replacement judges in the supreme court.
If I served on a jury I would have to do so in the summer
when our court was not in session.
There was also the possibility that the case in which I had
been a juror might come up on appeal. I would, of course,
have to disqualify myself from sitting on that appeal. The
rules of judicial ethics require that I avoid engaging in activi-
ties which are likely to come before me in an official capac-
ity.21 Still, the chances of the case coming to our court would
not be great. Of all the cases around the state, approximately
2400 cases a year are appealed to the court of appeals. 22 Of
those 2400 cases, only 600 seek review in the supreme court,
and of those we take about 100 cases per year.23 Besides, if a
case were likely to be appealed, the attorneys ought to be
smart enough to strike me from the jury. Indeed, the likeli-
hood of any attorney permitting me to sit on any jury was
small.
Members of the legal profession disagree about whether
lawyers and judges should sit on juries. Some would allow
lawyers and judges to serve in the interest of obtaining a more
representative jury. The Uniform Laws Commission does not
exempt lawyers and judges from jury duty in its proposals.24
The Commission proceeds on the principle that jury service
should be shared as widely as feasible and that business and
21. The Code of Judicial Ethics provides:
A judge shall not accept any duties or continue to administer or hold any
fiduciary position or position of trust, or incur any obligations which are, or will
be, inconsistent with the expeditious, impartial, and proper administration of the
duties of his office or which will involve association with enterprises or persons
which are likely to come before him in his official capacity.
In Re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 260, 153 N.W.2d 873,
877 (1967).
22. Clerk of Wisconsin Supreme Court, Court of Appeals Monthly Statistical Re-
port (Dec. 1985).
23. Clerk of Wisconsin Supreme Court, Supreme Court Monthly Statistical Report
(December 1985). Furthermore, approximately one hundred of the litigants seek to
bypass the court of appeals or the court of appeals requests the supreme court to take
the matter on certification. Id.
24. UNIF. JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT §§ 10,11,13 U.L.A. 528-31 (1980).
[Vol. 69:463
1986] VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BENCH 469
professional people should be excused only in cases of demon-
strated need.25
In contrast, those who seek to disqualify members of the
legal profession argue that lawyers could or might appear to
exercise overbearing influence in the deliberations of the jury
because of their specialized training and experience.
Although the American Bar Association Standards Relating
to Trial Courts do not exempt lawyers and judges from the
jury, the Commentary recommends that judges and lawyers
be excluded from jury service "because they are professionals
in the law."'26 The Commentary goes on to explain their rec-
ommendation as follows:
Their [lawyers' and judges'] presence on the jury could
be the cause of embarrassment by reason of their profes-
sional acquaintance with the judge and lawyers involved in
trying the case; their status as persons trained in the law can
easily give them disproportionate influence with fellow ju-
rors; their training may result in their having a special pro-
fessional outlook on law and justice that is incompatible
with the idea of decision by a lay jury.2"
Of course, the "expertise" of numerous classes of people-
engineers, doctors, teachers, farmers, depending on the subject
matter of the case-could, arguably, result in their becoming
overbearing in the jury deliberations. Our growing habit of
excluding people of education and experience from juries has
led many to conclude that juries were composed predomi-
nantly of the uneducated and the indolent.
25. McKusick & Boxer, Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, 8 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 280, 304 (1971).
26. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS § 2.11 commentary at 28 (1976).
27. For discussions of whether attorneys should serve on juries, see Alperson, Law-
yers Serving on Juries Reach Different Conclusions, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 26, 1983, at 3;
Beach, Jurors, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1947, at 112, 114; Bowers, Lawyer as Juror Can-
not Help Taking Advantage, Letter to the Editor, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 17, 1983, at 9;
Fitzpatrick, A Lawyer's Impression of Jury Duty, Or Who Would Leave A Lawyer On A
Jury?, 71 ILL. B.J. 702 (1983); Kerig, Perceptions from a Jury Box, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 306,
310, 312 (1979); Streit, A Citizen's Duty: Serving on the Jury, 44 A.B.A. J. 950, 951
(1958); A.B.A. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SUP-
PORTING STUDIES-3, Management of the Jury System, at 12 (1975); Legislative Com-
ment, The Questionable Validity of the Automatic Exemption of Attorneys from Jury
Service, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 837 (1980); Note, Jury Duty-Should Attorneys Serve?, 27
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To avoid the problem of undue influence, several judges
serving on juries maintained their anonymity. One of them,
Judge Sherman of the Massachusetts trial court, wrote that he
and the court staff had taken every precaution to avoid having
any of the jurors learn he was a judge.28 I thought perhaps I
could do that.
There was one final consideration. When I was appointed
to the bench nine years ago, I vowed I would not "get used to
it," as Chesterton said. Consequently, I have tried to see the
courtroom and the justice system from the perspectives of
others. When I travel in this country and abroad, I often ob-
serve other courts in session. Court proceedings look different
from the visitors' gallery than from the bench or from counsel
table. A view from the jury box would provide one more
perspective.
I decided not to exempt myself. Our legislature had not
chosen to disqualify lawyers and judges; it had left the matter
to each lawyer and to each judge. I would leave the question
of whether I should sit to the trial judge and counsel. I re-
sponded to the jury summons with a letter requesting a post-
ponement until July when the supreme court was in recess. I
was granted a postponement until Monday, July 2, 1984.
Each Monday, juries are selected for all the trials that will
take place in Dane County that week. Anyone not selected
for a jury on a given Monday is released until the following
Monday. A juror is on call for four Mondays.
BAYLOR L. REv. 381 (1975); Newman, Juries Are Selected by Outmoded Procedures,
Letter to the Editor, 45 A.B.A. J. 224 (1959).
On learning of my serving on a jury, a Madison lawyer raised these questions in a
letter to the Wisconsin State Bar:
1. How much influence would the judge have on lay members?
2. Suppose the judge feels the instructions were incorrect- should the judge fol-
low them anyway? Give the jury new instructions? Deal in her own mind with the
correct instructions?
3. Would the trial court feel comfortable upsetting a verdict in which a judge par-
ticipated?
The lawyer concluded that "[a]ny rule which permits a member of either the bench
or bar to sit on a jury immediately corrupts the integrity of the jury system, assuming a
juror is to deal with factual issues and not legal consequences only." Letters, 57 Wis. B.
BULL. 11 (Aug. 1984). See also Zweifel, Plain Talk, Capital Times (Madison, Wis.),
July 9, 1984, § 1, at 2 (discussing the letter).
28. Sherman, Eliminating Juror Confusion: A Judge's View from the Jury Box, 21
COURT REVIEW, Winter 1984, at 15, 16.
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Having heard that jury duty often means long waits and
delays, I gathered together many newspapers and a copy of
Alice Walker's The Color Purple in preparation for jury duty.
According to the Center for Jury Studies, jurors' most fre-
quent complaint is the waiting and lack of activity.29
On Monday, July 2, I reported to the jury room. The ju-
rors were chatting, reading newspapers, talking on the tele-
phone, or contemplating life in silence. I recognized several
people: a lawyer, a colleague of my husband's from the Uni-
versity, the spouse of a law student intern who worked in my
chambers, a former client. I sat down. The man across from
me smiled. A woman commented that she was confident that
Justice Abrahamson, whom she had read about in the newspa-
per,30 was not being kept waiting in this warm, crowded room.
The man across from me grinned. The fantasy of anonymity
was over.
Within the hour, staff people directed the jurors to several
courtrooms, forty or fifty of us to Judge Torphy's courtroom.
Prospective jurors now would be called. During one jury call,
my intern's spouse -asked to be excused because his wife had
gone to the hospital that morning to have a baby. The judge
excused him. The prospective jurors applauded and wished
him well.
When the clerk began calling names, mine was the third
one called.31 Justice Number Three was now Juror Number
Three. I entered the jury box; I looked up at the judge and
down at the people at the counsel table. The males dressed in
suits and ties would be the lawyers; the man in a sports shirt,
the defendant. The woman next to me whispered that she was
willing to bet that I would be knocked off the jury while she
would waste her time sitting there instead of being at her new
job. I had met the reluctant juror, a familiar figure in jury
29. A Survey of Jurors in Selected Pennsylvania Counties, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS REPORT, Dec. 1983, at 3.
30. Wis. State J. (Madison, Wis.), June 22, 1984, § 3, at 2, col. 1; Milw. Sentinel,
June 22, 1984, § 1, at 3, col. 3; Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), June 21, 1984, § 1, at 1,
col. 3.
31. The drawing of the petit jury is discussed at Wis. STAT. § 756.096 (1983-84).
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literature, and had heard the complaints of economic burden
and inconvenience.32
Twenty-three people were called,33 and the judge told us
that this was going to be a criminal case involving stealing.
The voir dire began.
"Voir dire" is French, meaning "to speak the truth." The
phrase denotes the questioning of the prospective jurors by the
lawyers and the judge.34 The lawyers would have to assess
these twenty-three strangers on the basis of our answers and
the information they had about us from Section A of the juror
questionnaire. One judge who served as a juror wrote: "As a
trial judge, I find most voir dire examinations ... consist of
relatively standard questions .... As a prospective juror, I
found I listened more intently .... I, too, listened intently.
From the juror's standpoint, the voir dire is similar to a job
interview.36 And I wanted the job. I had to be careful to be
32. For discussions of the reluctant juror and analyses of the attendant complaints
of economic hardship and inconvenience, see Karcher, The Juror's Lot Is Not a Happy
One, 14 N.J. ST. B.J. 25, 27 (1971); Macauley, Heubel, & Holzman, The Never Ending
Quest for Representative Juries: The Reluctant Juror, 1984 DET. C.L. REv. 919; Pabst,
Jr. & Munsterman, The Economic Hardship of Jury Duty, 58 JUDICATURE 495 (1975);
Pabst, Jr., Munsterman, & Mount, The Value of Jury Duty: Serving Is Believing, 61
JUDICATURE 38 (1977); Pabst, Jr., Munsterman, & Mount, The Myth of the Unwilling
Juror, 60 JUDICATURE 164 (1976); Richert, A New Verdict on Juror Willingness, 60
JUDICATURE 496 (1977); Azzarone, When Jury Duty Calls, NEW YORK, Aug. 24, 1981,
at 45; Wolfson, They also Serve Who Only Wait ... and Wait, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27,
1977, § 21 (Long Island Weekly), at 31, col. 1; Twelve Missing Men, NEWSWEEK, June
10, 1968, at 58; The Ordeal of Serving, TIME, Feb. 7, 1969, at 35; Why People Complain
about Jury Duty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 31, 1973, at 28; Editorial, Why
Do Solid Citizens Shrink from Jury Duty?, 224 SAT. EVE. POST, Mar. 29, 1952, at 10;
Editorial, The Jury Dodger, 198 SAT. EVE. POST, Mar. 13, 1926, at 30; Benefits of Jury
Duty to the Juror, 37 CENTURY ILLUSTRATED MONTHLY MAG. (n.s.) Mar. 1900 at
802.
33. Directions as to the number of jurors to be drawn appear at WIS. STAT.
§ 805.08(2) (1983-84).
34. The examination of the jurors under oath is explained at WIS. STAT.
§ 805.08(1) (1983-84).
35. Hittner, A Judge's View of Jury Service: A Personal Perspective, 47 TEx. B.J.
227, 228 (1984).
36. Several commentators have challenged extensive voir dire in the interest of pro-
tecting jurors' safety and privacy. See Lehman, The Unconstitutionality of Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges and Jury Books in Jury Selection, 14 LINCOLN L. REV. 53
(1983); Comment, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 708 (1982); Note, The Peremptory Challenge in a Criminal Case After
United States v. Barnes, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 173 (1980); Comment, Voir
Dire Limitations as a Means of Protecting Jurors' Safety and Privacy: United States v.
Barnes, 93 HARV. L. REV. 782 (1980); Note, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court: Is
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scrupulously honest in answering the questions and not to be
concerned about keeping myself on the panel.
The lawyers' questioning is designed first to identify any
jurors who are not competent or who are biased. These jurors
might be excused by the judge for cause. In this case defense
counsel advised us that the defendant was Egyptian and held
dual citizenship. He asked whether these facts would influ-
ence any of us and prevent us from giving the defendant a fair
trial. No hands were raised.
In another criminal case for which a jury was selected that
day, the defendant was a black Cuban man who spoke little
English. We were told that the man sitting next to the defend-
ant whispering into his ear was an interpreter. Just five
months earlier our court had written an opinion requiring the
state to furnish interpreters to indigent criminal defendants
who do not understand English.38 I was surprised how dis-
tracting the interpreter's whispering was and how defense
counsel had to strain to hear the jurors' responses. Neverthe-
less, despite the distraction, I thought our opinion was right.
It was essential that the defendant understand what was hap-
pening in the courtroom.
Defense counsel asked a series of questions to discover
whether any of the jurors harbored prejudice against a black
or a Cuban.39 There were no blacks in the jury box, and of the
There a Juror Right to Privacy That Justifies Closing Voir Dire in Criminal Trials?, 30
S.D.L.REv. 134 (1984); Footlick & Gayle, Juror Privacy, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1978,
at 89; Turner, California Sued Over Practice of Investigating Jurors and Selling Reports
to Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1976, § 1, at 9, col. 1; A Prospective Juror is Facing
Charge for Rejecting Questions, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1976, § 1, at 31, col. 5.
37. Wis. STAT. § 805.08(1) (1983-84) provides:
Qualifications, examination.
The court shall examine on oath each person who is called as a juror to discover
whether the juror is related by blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney
appearing in the case, or has any financial interest in the case, or has expressed
or formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case. Ifa juror
is not indifferent in the case, the juror shall be excused. Any party objecting for
cause to ajuror may introduce evidence in support of the objection. This section
shall not be construed as abridging in any manner the right of either party to
supplement the court's examination of any person as to qualifications, but such
examination shall not be repetitious or based upon hypothetical questions.
38. State v. Neave, 117 Wis. 2d 359, 344 N.W.2d 181 (1984).
39. In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), the Court held that on the facts
of the particular case, the trial judge was constitutionally compelled to inquire into the
possibility of racial prejudice. In subsequent cases the Court clarified Ham, holding
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other jurors in the room, only one was black and one was ori-
ental. Minorities are typically underrepresented on juries. 40
Would anyone confess to such prejudices? One juror raised
his hand. He said that on the basis of his job experiences, he
did not think he could give the defendant a fair trial. The
lawyers looked at the judge. The judge thanked the juror for
his honesty and excused him.
Jury researchers-and that group includes lawyers, soci-
ologists, psychologists, social psychologists, anthropologists,
linguists, and experts in communications and persuasion-are
attempting to find out what kinds of questions would uncover
racial and other biases. The possibility of hidden bias presents
an important concern for courts committed to fair trials.41
In the last few years our court has reviewed two trouble-
some cases raising the question of juror bias. In both cases,
after the jury had rendered a verdict, a juror later asserted
that bigotry had tainted the deliberations.
that there is no absolute right to question jurors about racial bias whenever there may
be a confrontation in a criminal trial between persons of different races. Inquiry is
constitutionally mandated only when special circumstances inextricably link the issue of
race with the factual issues at trial. See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
In Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held
"that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective
jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias." Id.
at 1688. The Court said that it was not retreating from Ristiano; the Turner case differs
from Ristiano because in Turner the defendant was not only being accused of a crime
against a white victim, but also the crime charged was a capital case.
40. Zeisel, Foreword to The American Jury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1980, at 1, 6. Wis. STAT. § 756.02(2)(c) (1983-84) provides that "[n]o citizen may be
excluded from service as grand or petit juror in any court of this state on account of
race or color . . . ." A trial judge's purposeful, although well meaning, exclusion of
Native Americans as potential jurors as a class without proper examination and individ-
ual determination of cause violated equal protection of rights of defendant, a Chippewa
Indian. State v. Chosa, 108 Wis. 2d 392, 321 N.W.2d 280 (1982). Cf. State v. Grady,
93 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 286 N.W.2d 607, 611-12 (Ct. App. 1979) (upholding state's use of
peremptory strikes to remove all black jurors from black defendant's jury). But cf.
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), where the Court rejected Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), upon which Grady rests.
For a discussion of the use of the peremptory challenge to strike jurors of a particu-
lar race, see Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REv. 257, 287-92 (1986).
41. Vivian Gornick reports that the jury on which she served scrupulously avoided
any reference to color-until the twelfth hour of its deliberations. Then, "[t]he word
black was a match struck to a can of gasoline: conflagration blazed in less than thirty
seconds." The judge had asked the jurors to reason from the evidence; no one, Ms.
Gornick wrote, "counted on the implacable weight of racial hostility." Gornick, On the
Jury, ATL. MONTHLY, June 1979, at 73.
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In the first case, a juror in a civil case said that during
deliberations another juror had referred to a corporation's of-
ficer as a "cheap Jew." 42  The verdict was against the
corporation.
In the second case, a criminal case involving prostitution,
the jury had been deliberating for six hours when one juror
said to the others: "Let's be logical, he's a black, and he sees a
seventeen year old white girl-I know the type." Another
member of the jury expressed agreement with the statement.
Within twenty minutes the jury found the defendant guilty of
soliciting prostitutes and keeping a place of prostitution.43
The issue for our court was whether to permit these two
jurors to testify about the deliberations. Resolution of this is-
sue turned on other questions: To what extent and under
what circumstances should the court allow losing parties to
challenge verdicts? How important is the value of finality?
Should courts zealously guard confidentiality of the jury's de-
liberations? Or, if there is a charge of ethnic or racial bias,
should the court allow the jury to be examined for impartial-
ity? In the civil case, our court ordered the trial court to hear
the juror's testimony. In the criminal case, the court refused
to permit the challenge to the verdict.
While one purpose of the voir dire is to uncover bias, a
second purpose is to allow the parties to eliminate those jurors
who they think might, for one reason or other, be unsympa-
thetic to their position. Each side may strike a limited
number of jurors; this is the peremptory challenge.
While lawyers talk about wanting an impartial jury, in re-
ality, each side attempts to seat jurors with psychological pre-
dispositions favoring its side. According to jury folklore,
some groups are more apt to favor the defense, and others, the
42. After Hour Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 736,
324 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1982).
43. State v. Shillcutt, 119 Wis. 2d 788, 791-92, 350 N.W.2d 686, 688-89 (1984). See
also State v. Finney, 337 N.W.2d 167 (S.D. 1983). For an analysis of a litigant's ability
to impeach the verdict, see Buchanan, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts in Arizona, 21
ARIz. L. REv. 821 (1979); Thompson, Challenge to the Decisionmaking Process: Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 606(b) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. L.J.
1187 (1985); Note, State v. Finney: Admissibility of Juror Affidavits Alleging Racial
Prejudice Under S.D.C.L. Section 19-14-7, 29 S.D.L. Rnv. 144 (1983); Note, Racial
Slurs by Jurors as Groundsfor Impeaching a Jury's Verdict: State v. Shillcutt, 1985 Wis.
L. REv. 1481.
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prosecution." In 1936 Clarence Darrow, for example, recom-
mended Congregationalists and Unitarians for the "under-
dog" rather than Baptists and Presbyterians.45
All of us have predilections, whether or not we are aware
of them or are willing to admit them. Russell Baker "admit-
ted" his in reaction to his summons to jury duty. He wrote:
Most people are surely willing to spend some time at the
courthouse without pay if they can have the chance to send
people to jail and bring in large financial judgments against
those utilities that are always raising your rates and then
telling you to "have a nice day."... I don't want to suggest
that I would be a bad juror .... I certainly wouldn't dream
of bringing in a multimillion-dollar finding against some de-
testable public utility until its lawyers had finished their de-
vious attempts to distort all the evidence and smear the good
name of the poor crippled widow who had brought the suit.
This notice in the mail warns me that unless I acknowledge
it within 10 days I will be haled into court and subjected to
the rigors of the law. They don't have to threaten me. Back
it goes in this afternoon's mail. I can't wait to start loading
the trains to Attica and making poor crippled widows very,
very happy.46
44. For discussions of lawyers' "rules of selection," see Green & Donahue, Law
and Order: Take Twelve, PHILADELPHIA MAG., Nov. 1975, at 76; Plutchik &
Schwartz, Jury Selection: Folklore or Science?, I CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (1965); Lehman,
The Ideal Juror, LIBERTY, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 7, 10; Mogil, Voir Dire and Jury Psychol-
ogy, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 382 (1979); Twelve Missing Men, NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1968, at
58.
45. Goldstein, The Science of Jury Selection, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1975, § 4, at 6,
col. 4. Darrow's final words of advice: "You may defy all the rest of the rules if you get
a man who laughs.., a juror who laughs hates to find anyone guilty." Plutchik &
Schwartz, Jury Selection: Folklore or Science?, 1 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 4 (1965).
46. Baker, My Day in Court, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 12, col.
2.
For discussions of how the identity of the litigants and jurors may affect juror deci-
sion making, see Stephan, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants: Their Influ-
ence on Juries' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 97 (R.J. Simon ed. 1975);
Botter, Jury Bias in Hudson and Bergen Counties: .4 View from the Bench, 4 SETON
HALL L. REv. I (1972); Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror
Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1079 (1965); Report, Juries Hit Cor-
porate and Government Defendants Hardest, 71 A.B.A. J. 146 (1985); Peterson & Chin,
Juries Don't Ignore Assets and Identity of Defendant, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 11, 1985 (Special
Litigation Report), at 15, col. 3.
For studies about who wins, who loses, and whether juries treat everyone the same,
see publications of the Institute for Civil Justice (The Rand Corporation): A. CHIN &
M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY
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Social science research indicates that the lawyer's hunches
or intuitions about jury selections are unreliable. Psycholo-
gists have been attempting to relate specific juror characteris-
tics to a general propensity to convict or acquit. Members of
the legal and social science communities question the success
of the social scientists' approach.
Since the late 1960s, lawyers have hired social scientists as
consultants to aid in jury selection.47 The validity of the con-
TRIALS (1985); M. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS
IN COOK COUNTY (1984); M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE:
CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-80 (1983); M.
PETERSON & G. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK
COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (1982).
Defense counsel exercised the peremptory challenge and struck Chrysler Chairman
Lee Iacocca from a jury that would determine the guilt of a store manager accused of
stealing $700. Defense counsel explained his strike as follows: .'It was a case of embez-
zlement against an employer, and I felt [Iacocca] might be undully (sic) employer-
minded .... And with him being on TV and all, I thought the force of his personality
would lead him to have an extraordinary influence on the other jurors."' Wis. St. J.,
Feb. 19, 1984, § I, at 14, col. 1.
47. For discussions of the use of consultants in particular trials, see Bermant, Juries
and Justice: "The Notion of Conspiracy is Not Tasty to Americans," PSYCHOLOGY To-
DAY, May 1975, at 60; McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in
Trials with Political and Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1977, at 205; Moore, Jr., Redressing the Balance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec.
1974, at 29; Saks, The Limits of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17
JURIMETRICS J. 3 (1976); Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich & Christie, Recipe for a
Jury, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1973, at 37; Wieder, Juries on Trial, HARPER'S
WEEKLY, June 28, 1976, at 8; Zeisel & Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-
Stans Conspiracy Trial, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 151; Note, Putting Limits on
Jury Research, 118 SOLICITORS' J. 55 (1974).
According to an editorial in the Milwaukee Sentinel, in the Milwaukee County trial
of Terrance B. Davis for the murder of two Milwaukee police officers, the public de-
fender's office hired a psychologist at the approximate cost of $3500 to provide ques-
tions to ask potential jurors and to advise the defense lawyer on which jurors to strike.
The Milwaukee district attorney acknowledged that the district attorney's office runs
computer background checks of potential male jurors. He asserted that the checks are
done to determine if any of the jurors have had problems with the law. The public
defender implied that the checks are made to determine the juror's tendency to vote for
conviction.
The editorial commented on these tactics as follows:
If the case against Davis had been purely circumstantial, then, of course, the
expense of bringing in a psychologist might have been worth it.
But the case against Davis was very strong. And little that a psychologist
could do would have changed that. It is, therefore, a case of a disturbing prece-
dent being established-and with taxpayers' money.
The tactic [of computer checks], if indeed employed by the DA's office,
might raise some questions about the sanctity of the jury system, at least in terms
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sultants' advice depends on two assumptions: first, that a sur-
vey can determine the general relationship between juror
characteristics and a propensity to favor a particular party,
and second, that the particular juror in the jury box will be-
have according to this relationship. The correctness of these
assumptions and the value of scientific jury selection is being
debated in the popular press and in the professional journals.48
In addition to general questions of validity, the injection of
the behavioral sciences into the selection of juries raises signif-
icant social and administrative questions. One is cost and the
ability of the rich and the poor to obtain equal justice. A sec-
ond and equally significant question is the effect of such jury
selection on the ability to obtain a fair trial. When a jury rep-
resents a cross section of the community, we assume that the
biases, training, experiences, and values of the individuals will
balance each other. The objective of psychological screening
of whether performance at one trial should be a measure for another, totally
different proceeding.
Davis Trial Raises Troubling Questions, Milw. Sentinel, Nov. 8, 1985, at 18, col. 1.
A Connecticut lawyer recently retained a juror from a hung jury as a consultant in
his client's second trial. See Gombossy, Ex-Juror Retained as Trial Consultant, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 30, 1985, at 3; Lawyer Hires an Ex-Juror for Retrial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31,
1986, § 1, at 15, col. 1. For a discussion of the use of the "shadow jury" to assess the
possible reactions of the actual jury during the course of the trial, see Gobert, Can
Psychologists Tip the Scales of Justice?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1984, at 38; Vinson,
The Shadow Jury: An Experiment in Litigation Science, 68 A.B.A. J. 1242 (1982).
48. For examples of the debate on the validity of investigation of jurors and scien-
tific juror selection and the effect of such techniques on the jury and on the judicial
system, see Berk, Hennessy & Swan, The Vagaries and Vulgarities of "Scientific" Jury
Selection, 1 EVALUATION Q. 143 (1977); Diamond & Zeisel, Jury: Jury Behavior, in 3
ENCY. CRIME & JUST. 927, 929-32 (1983); Gobert, Can Psychologists Tip the Scales of
Justice?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1984, at 38; Lees-Haley, The Psychology of Jury
Selection, 47 TEx. B.J. 918 (1984); Hunt, Putting Juries on the Couch, N.Y. Times, Nov.
28, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 70; Kahn, Picking Peers: Social Scientists'Role in Selection
of Juries Sparks Legal Debate, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 1; McConahay,
Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Political and Racial Over-
tones: The Trial ofJoan Little, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1977, at 205; Okun,
Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 GEO. L.J.
839 (1968); Shapley, Jury Selection: Social Scientists Gamble in an Already Loaded
Game, 185 SCIENCE 1033 (1974); Shell, Scientific Jury Selection: Does It Work?, BAR-
RISTER, Summer 1980, at 47; Tivnan, Jury by Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1975, § 6
(Magazine), at 30, col. 1; Vinson, Confronting Juror Bias: A Behavioral Science Perspec-
tive, FOR THE DEFENSE, Mar. 1985, at 14; Vinson, Litigation: An Introduction to the
Application of Behavioral Science, 15 CONN. L. REV. 767 (1983); Wrightsman, The
American Jury on Trial Empirical Evidence and Procedural Modifications, 34 J. So-
CIAL ISSUES 137, 147-50 (1978); Note, The Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre-Voir
Dire Juror Studies, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 597 (1976).
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of jurors is to obtain a jury with a shared bias. Some critics
suggest barring this type of tampering with jury selection by
limiting the information available about jurors, limiting the
scope of voir dire, and reducing the number of peremptory
challenges.4 9
At this stage, due to our limited knowledge about human
behavior and in light of our failure to resolve the attendant
social issues of scientific jury selection, psychologists and law-
yers suggest that perhaps the most significant objective of the
voir dire is to familiarize the jurors with the case. They sug-
gest that voir dire be used to inoculate the jurors against unfa-
vorable facts, to emphasize favorable law or facts, and to
guide the jurors in sorting out the facts and law of the case.
Furthermore, psychologists tell us that persons who make
public commitments to behave in certain ways are likely to
follow through on those commitments."
In our case the district attorney started the questioning.
Do you know the defendant? Do you know any of the attor-
neys? Do you or any members of your family work for the
Madison police department or sheriff's office? When he asked
whether any of us knew people in the district attorney's or
public defender's office, I raised my hand. Could I neverthe-
less decide the case impartially? Yes. The prosecutor asked
whether any of us would be unwilling to convict a person of
stealing even if the amount stolen was small or if we dis-
agreed with the law. We committed ourselves to apply the
law, like it or not. 1
49. See, e.g., Etzioni, Creating an Imbalance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 28.
50. For discussions of the objectives of voir dire, see, e.g., Fried, Kaplan & Klein,
Juror Selection: An Analysis of Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 49, 50
(R.J. Simon ed. 1975); Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social
Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 248-50 (1981).
51. For discussions of the juror as policymaker and jury nullification (Le., the jury's
deciding the case on the basis of its own conscience rather than on the basis of the law
as instructed), see, e.g., M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY (1973);
Barkan, Jury Nullification in Political Trials, 31 SOc. PROS. 28 (1983); Becker, Jury
Nullification: Can a Jury Be Trusted?, TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at 41; Christie, Book Review,
Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedi-
ence, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1289 (1974); Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52
HARV. L. REv. 582 (1939); Irish, Does Conscience Matter More Than Law?, UPDATE,
Winter 1981, at 18; Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy-Making: The Role of the
Jury, 39 J. POL. 73 (1977); Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J.
INT'L L. 71 (1969); Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
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Defense counsel asked whether any of us would be influ-
enced by the fact the defendant was divorced and had violated
a court order not to see his former wife. I immediately
surmised that the defendant was going to testify and that the
lawyer was telling us of prior offenses instead of letting the
state bring forth the defendant's misdeeds. Our silence com-
mitted us not to hold those prior acts against the defendant in
judging him on the alleged crime. 2
Defense counsel asked, "Do you know who Juror Number
Three is?" He pointed at me. No response. "In real life she's
Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court," he
said. "She's here just like the rest of you-to listen and to
decide the case on the evidence; Judge Torphy will explain the
law to you and to her. Will any of you be more persuaded by
her than by anyone else? Are you going to let her dominate
jury deliberations?" They shook their heads no. Defense
counsel was thus instructing us about my role. I was relieved
that my identity was out in the open. If the defendant was to
get a fair trial, either all the jurors should know my occupa-
tion or none of them should know.
Voir dire lasted about an hour. Now each lawyer would
strike five of us.5 3 That would leave thirteen, one of whom
SEARCH J. 605; Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13
LAW & Soc'y RaV. 781 (1979); Richardson, Jury Nullification: Justice or Anarchy?,
CASE & COMMENT, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 30; Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to
Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972); Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The
Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51; Simson,
Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REV. 488
(1976); Tavris, The Law of an Unwritten Law: A Common Sense View of Jury Nullifica-
tion, I1 W. ST. U. L. REv. 97 (1983); Van Dyke, The Jury As a Political Institution, 16
CATH. LAW. 224 (1970); Van Dyke, The Jury As a Political Institution, CENTER MAG.,
Mar.-Apr. 1970, at 17; Van Dyke, Follow-up/The Jury, CENTER MAG., July-Aug. 1970,
at 59; Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals
of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. RaV. 1001, 1012-23 (1980); Note, Jury Nullifica-
tion: The Forgotten Right, 7 NEw ENG. L. REv. 105 (1971).
52. For a discussion of the effect of a juror's failure to respond to a question in voir
dire, see McDonough Power Equip. Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984); State v.
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 714-18, 721-32, 370 N.W.2d 745, 761-62, 764-69 (1985).
53. The number of peremptory challenges permitted in criminal cases is set forth in
Wis. STAT. § 972.03 (1983-84).
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would be an alternate and would be eliminated by lot before
we entered deliberations. 4
I silently made my own strikes. One choice was the wo-
man next to me who had told the lawyers during voir dire how
unhappy she was to be serving when she had just started a
new job. I was right-she was off. Another choice was a wo-
man whose relative worked for the Dane County Sheriff's de-
partment. I was wrong- she stayed on. Since all my friends
had told me that I would be struck, I concluded that I would
be. Wrong again; although I was later struck from two drunk
driving cases.
The trial began on Friday: The Case of the Missing City
Directory.
The judge advised us that because the trial would be short,
he thought it unnecessary to permit us to take notes. I leaned
forward. The judge was carefully complying with the statute
which requires the trial judge to determine whether the jurors
may take notes of the proceedings and to state the reasons for
the determination.5 Juror note taking is controversial in legal
circles. Proponents say it helps the jury keep the facts
straight. Opponents say that note taking is distracting, that
the notes may be wrong, that the person who takes notes has
too much influence, and that jurors need not take notes since
54. Wis. STAT. §§ 972.04(1), 972.10(7) (1983-84) allow more than twelve jurors to
be impaneled and provide for discharge of the extra jurors. See State v. Lehman, 108
Wis. 2d 291, 321 N.W.2d 212 (1982) (discussing substitution of alternate jurors).
55. Wis. STAT. § 972.10(1) (a) (1983-84) provides as follows:
(a) After the selection of a jury, the court shall determine if the jurors may
take notes of the proceedings:
1. If the court authorizes note-taking, the court shall instruct the jurors
that they may make written notes of the proceedings, except the closing argu-
ments, if they so desire and that the court will provide materials for that purpose
if they so request. The court shall stress the confidentiality of the notes to the
jurors. The jurors may refer to their notes during the proceedings and delibera-
tion. The notes may not be the basis for or the object of any motion by any
party. After the jury has rendered its verdict, the court shall ensure that the
notes are promptly collected and destroyed.
2. If the court does not authorize note-taking, the court shall state the rea-
sons for the determination on the record.
For a similar provision relating to civil trials, see Wis. STAT. § 805.13(2) (1983-84).
These provisions were amended by Supreme Court Order filed April 30, 1986, to ex-
clude written notes of the opening statements.
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they can ask to hear testimony repeated.5 6 Our case would be
a short trial with relatively simple facts. But no one juror rec-
ollected every detail. Like others, our jury had what Profes-
sors Kalven and Zeisel call "collective recall. ' 57 Each juror
remembers and shares different parts of the trial from a differ-
ent perspective.
The lawyers first presented opening statements and then
their witnesses. An employee in the city assessor's office testi-
fied that she helped the defendant use the city directory be-
longing to the assessor's office. A police officer testified that
two weeks later he found the city assessor's directory in the
defendant's car when he arrested the defendant and im-
pounded the car.
The defendant, a graduate student at the University of
Wisconsin, testified he had gone to the assessor's office to con-
sult the directory for clues to his wife's whereabouts. He had
taken the book to the University to duplicate some pages be-
cause the duplicating machine outside the assessor's office was
broken. The state stipulated that the machine was broken.
The import of the defendant's testimony was that he intended
to return the book.
There were a few objections to the questions, and the judge
handled them easily. The jurors in this trial were not given
the opportunity to ask the witnesses any questions. Although
it is within the judge's discretion to allow such questions, few
judges do; and one of the usual complaints of jurors is that
they do not get the facts they think are important. It is
strange that jurors cannot ask questions. "In very few other
56. Wisconsin Judicial Council Committee on Improving Jury Communications,
Final Report, 29 (June 21, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) recommended, on the basis
of a study of ninety-six jury trials, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopt a rule
amending sees. 805.13(2)(a) and 972.10(1)(a) requiring the court to permit jurors to
take notes during all or part of the trial proceedings. See note 55 supra.
For discussions of note-taking by jurors, see, e.g., Report of the Committee on Juries
of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit 60-75 (Aug. 1984); Austin, Research Sup-
ports Note-Taking by Jurors, 56 CLEV. B.J. 46 (Dec. 1984); Parry, Taking Note of Note-
taking, 10 COL. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 565 (1974); Petrotf, The Practice of Jury Note Tak-
ing-Misconduct, Right, or Privilege?, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 125 (1965); Silas, Juror Notes,
72 A.B.A. J. 20 (1986); Stephens, Note-Taking Jurors-Why Not?, 25 REs GESTAE 406
(1981); Urbom, Toward Better Treatment of Jurors by Judges, 61 NEB. L. REV. 409,
409-17 (1982); Note, Questions to Witnesses and Notetaking by the Jury as Aids in Un-
derstanding Complex Litigation, 18 NEW ENG. L. REv. 687 (1983).
57. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 151 (1966).
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instances in life do you have people trying to make relevant
decisions without asking questions.
After lunch the lawyers presented their closing arguments
and Judge Torphy instructed us on the applicable law. Hav-
ing often read these instructions in my own chambers, both in
the form books and in the trial records of cases before our
court on review, I was familiar with them. I wondered
whether the instructions were clear to jurors who were not
familiar with them. Hearing them, I thought they seemed dif-
ferent from what I had read silently to myself.
I knew that the judge would give the jury a written copy of
the instructions for its deliberations.5 9 Our court had recently
upheld the validity of a statute requiring judges to do so. The
58. Andrews, Exhibit A: Language, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1984, at 28, 32.
For a discussion of jurors asking questions, see Wisconsin Judicial Council Commit-
tee on Improving Jury Communications, Final Report, 2-5, 11-17 (June 21, 1985) (un-
published manuscript); Report of the Committee on Juries of the Judicial Council of the
Second Circuit 51-59 (Aug. 1984); Center for Jury Studies News, National Center for
State Courts Report, Mar. 1981, at 3; Urbom, Toward Better Treatment of Jurors by
Judges, 61 NEB. L. REv. 409, 417-22 (1982); Note, Questions to Witnesses and Notetak-
ing by the Jury as Aids in Understanding Complex Litigation, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV.
687, 697-708 (1983).
59. Wis. STAT. § 805.13(4) (1983-84), applicable to civil trials, provides:
INSTRUCTION. The court shall instruct the jury before or after closing
arguments of counsel. Failure to object to a material variance or omission be-
tween the instructions given and the instructions proposed does not constitute a
waiver of error. The court shall provide the jury with one complete set of writ-
ten instructions providing the substantive law to be applied to the case to be
decided.
Wis. STAT. § 972.10(5) (1983-84), applicable to criminal trials, provides:
When the evidence is concluded and the testimony closed, if either party
desires special instructions to be given to the jury, the instructions shall be re-
duced to writing, signed by the party or his or her attorney and ified with the
clerk, unless the court otherwise directs. Counsel for the parties, or the defend-
ant if he or she is without counsel, shall be allowed reasonable opportunity to
examine the instructions requested and to present and argue to the court objec-
tions to the adoption or rejection of any instructions requested by counsel. The
court shall advise the parties of the instructions to be given. Counsel, or the
defendant if he or she is not represented by counsel, shall specify and state the
particular ground on which the instruction is objected to, and it shall not be
sufficient to object generally that the instruction does not state the law, or is
against the law, but the objection shall specify with particularity how the in-
struction is insufficient or does not state the law or to what particular language
there is an objection. All objections shall be on the record. The court shall
provide the jury with one complete set of written instructions providing the sub-
stantive law to be applied to the case to be decided.
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statute had been challenged as a usurpation of the judicial
function.'
In legal circles the issue of furnishing the jury written in-
structions is controversial. Some say that the juror's ability to
read the instructions helps the jury. Others say that on its
own the jury may pay undue attention to particular words or
phrases in the instructions.61
The Wisconsin jury instructions are drafted by a commit-
tee of lawyers and judges. No persons trained in communica-
tions or the behavioral sciences take part in the drafting. As
you might guess, comprehensibility of jury instructions is a
major problem in law today.62
60. E.B. v. State, 111 Wis. 2d 175, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983). The E.B. court con-
cluded that instructions relating to the burden of proof did not fall within the statute
requiring the jury to be funished with written instructions on substantive law and that a
court's failure to submit written instructions to the jury does not mandate automatic
reversal. Wisconsin Judicial Council, Committee on Improving Jury Communications,
Final Report, at 29 (June 21, 1985) (unpublished manuscript), recommended that secs.
805.13(4) and 972.10(5) be amended to require that one set of written instructions set-
ting forth the burden of proof be provided to the jury for use during deliberations.
These provisions were amended by Supreme Court Order filed April 30, 1986, to require
that written instructions concerning the burden of proof be furnished to the jury.
61. For discussions of the pros and cons of giving jurors written instructions, see
Wisconsin Judicial Council, Committee on Improving Jury Communications, Final Re-
port (June 21, 1985), pp. 6-7, 26-28; Urbom, Toward Better Treatment of Jurors by
Judges, 61 NEB. L. REV. 409, 422-26 (1982); Report of the Committee on Juries of the
Judicial Council of the Second Circuit 76-88 (Aug. 1984) (including experience with
jury having tape recording of instructions); Andrews, Exhibit A: Language, PSYCHOL-
OGY TODAY, Feb. 1984, at 28, 32.
62. On October 11-12, 1985, the University of Bridgeport sponsored a national
symposium on "The Right to Comprehensible Jury Instructions." The proceedings will
be published in the University of Bridgeport Law Review. See Center for Jury Studies
News, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS REPORT, Nov. 1985, at 3.
For discussions of making jury instructions comprehensible, see also Andrews, supra
note 58; Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycho-lin-
guistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Elwork, Alfini &
Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432 (1982); Forston,
Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 612-23;
Higginbotham, Helping the Jury Understand, LITIGATION, Summer 1980, at 5; Meyer
& Rosenberg, Questions Juries Ask Untapped Springs of Insight, 55 JUDICATURE 105
(1971); Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 731 (1981); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend
and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982); Severance,
Greene & Loftus, Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1984); Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat
to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976); Comment, Improving Jury Deliberations: A Re-
consideration of Lesser Included Offense Instructions, 16 J. L. REFORM 561 (1983);
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A key instruction in this case was the one about the de-
fendant's intent. The parties apparently were disputing only
Center for Jury Studies News, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS REPORT, Nov.
1985, at 3; Guilty, I Mean Innocent, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1975, at 64.
If legal instructions are not confusing in and of themselves, the use of the improper
gender-pronouns to refer to the parties may render them confusing. In a recent case the
dissenting justices commented on the jury instructions as follows:
This court has emphasized that jury instructions are to reflect the facts of the
particular case. Nevertheless, the trial judge told the jury that the instructions
were written using masculine pronouns and that the pronouns would not be
changed to the feminine when referring to Bernita Willis. The judge then in-
structed the jury that "whenever he, his or him is used in these instructions, it
may refer either to the plaintiff, Ryan Betchkal, or the defendant, Bernita Willis,
whichever is appropriate for the particular instruction." Compounding the gen-
der confusion, the trial judge then proceeded to violate his own instructions.
Sometimes "he" in the instructions refers only to the male plaintiff or only to the
female defendant or to both parties; sometimes "he or she" is used; sometimes
"they" or "one" refer to one party and sometimes to both parties; and other
times "she" and "her" refer to the female defendant.
Betchkal v. Willis,127 Wis. 2d 177, 191-92, 378 N.W.2d 684, 691 (1985) (Heffernan,
C.J., Abrahamson, J., and Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
Wisconsin Judicial Council Committee on Improving Jury Communications, Final
Report, at 29 (June 21, 1985) (unpublished manuscript), concluded that the jury was
assisted in understanding the evidence if it received preliminary instructions. The Com-
mittee recommended that secs. 805.13(2)(b) and 972. 10(l)(b) be amended to permit the
court to give preliminary instructions, "including, without limitation because of
enumeration, a description of the nature of the case or the elements of the offense
charged, what constitutes evidence and what does not, guidance regarding the burden of
proof and the credibility of witnesses, and directions not to discuss the case until delib-
erations begin."
Wis. STAT. § 805.13(2)(b) (1983-84) provides as follows: "The court may give addi-
tional preliminary instructions to the jury which instructions may again be given in the
charge at the close of the evidence."
Wis. STAT. § 972.10(l)(b) (1983-84) provides as follows: "The court may give the
jurors additional instructions as to their duties. The additional instructions shall be
furnished the parties before they are given and either party may object to any specific
instruction or propose instructions of its own to be given prior to trial."
For other support for instructions prior to taking of evidence, see Report of the
Committee on Juries of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit 40-50 (Aug. 1984);
Andrews, supra note 58, at 32-33.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court amended sees. 805.13(4) and 972.10(1)(b) by order
fied April 30, 1986, to read as follows:
The court may give additional instructions to assist the jury in understanding its
duty and the evidence it will hear. The preliminary instructions may include,
without limitation, a description of the nature of the case, what constitutes evi-
dence and what does not, guidance regarding the burden of proof and the credi-
bility of witrnesses, and directions not to discuss the case until deliberations
begin. Any such preliminary jury instructions may be given again in the charge
at the close of the evidence. The additional preliminary instructions shall be
disclosed to the parties before they are given and either party may object to any
specific instruction or propose instructions of its own to be given prior to trial.
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one element of the crime as defined in the instructions:
whether the defendant intended to deprive the city perma-
nently of its book. The instructions explained-and consider
this carefully, please-that "the intent to deprive the owner
permanently of possession means that the defendant has the
purpose permanently to deprive the owner of such posses-
sion."' 63 The instruction goes on to say, such intent must be
found as a fact before the jury can find the defendant guilty.
We could not look into the defendant's mind to find his intent.
We would have to determine such intent directly or indirectly
from all the facts presented in evidence, from statements or
conduct of the defendant which indicated his state of mind.
We were the sole judges of the facts and must not find the
defendant guilty unless we were satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended to deprive the city perma-
nently of possession."
I thought I now understood why the lawyers had not
struck me from the jury. A lawyer or judge would have no
better insight into intent than would the machine repair per-
son, the homemaker, the government employee, or the retiree
who were also on the jury.
It was two-thirty when the bailiff escorted us to the jury
room. We were twelve strangers locked in an austere, win-
dowless room with a large gray metal table, fifteen or sixteen
chairs, two adjoining washrooms, water, coffee, paper, pencils,
the jury instructions, and the key exhibit-the City Directory.
Another juror paged through the directory; the inside cover
revealed its price--about $130.
In Dane County the jurors are given an orientation program and view a film about
jury duty. Jurors have commented that they would benefit from juror education pro-
grams. See, e.g., Crosgrave, A Juror's Experiences, 21 ILL. L. REv. 530, 531 (1927);
A.I.G., Confessions of a Juror, Wis. B. BULL., Aug. 1956, at 21, 65; Goren, Ladies and
Gentlemen of the Jury, 28 J. EDUC. Soc. 325 (1955); Inglewood, Thoughts of a
Jurywoman, WOMAN'S JOURNAL, Dec. 1929, at 24, 25, 44; Kennebeck, From the Jury
Box, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 235, 249 (R.J. Simon ed. 1975); McKelway,
Layman's View of Jury Service, 5 F.R.D. 207 (1945); Seymour, "They Don't Care About
Us" 51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 380, 416 (1979).
63. Wis. JI-Criminal 1441 (1980).
64. Id. at 2-3. See Note, Direct Evidence of State of Mind: A Philosophical'Analysis
of How Facts in Evidence Support Conclusions Regarding Mental State, 1985 Wis. L.
REv. 435.
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By about six o'clock it appeared that the jurors would be
dining together. The bailiff said he would order sandwiches
and offered to call our families. I had a further request for the
bailiff: would he mind reading a recipe to my husband over
the phone? I had agreed to take hors d'oeuvres to a dinner
party that night, a party for people attending a conference on
judicial disability. I quickly wrote out the recipe. Seymour
would have to make the dish and deliver it, along with my
regrets.
After dinner we resumed our deliberations. We continued
to discuss the evidence from a myriad of angles. The Dane
County Juror's Handbook encouraged us to speak fully and
frankly and to listen carefully to the comments of our fellow
jurors. 5 We did. The jury handbook and jury instructions
admonished us not to rely on any private sources of informa-
tion but to use our own experiences, knowledge, and common
sense in reaching our conclusions.66 The line between private
sources of knowledge and experiences on the one hand and
knowledge and common sense on the other is not bright and
clear. Nevertheless, we tried to keep on the correct side of the
line. One judge tells juries to picture the words "experience"
and "common sense" "in capitals reaching from the floor to
the ceiling of the courtroom." 67
The juror's handbook said that "jury deliberation is not
the place for emotions, prejudice or sympathy, but rather for
the calm review of the facts and applicable law."' 68 Sometimes
we were calm and sometimes we were not. We voted-by
hand, by voice around the table, by secret ballot. We also
spoke out of turn-sometimes several speaking at the same
time. There were hoarse comments, angry shouts, and laugh-
ter, apparently audible at times in the corridor. A newspaper
reported that "at one point, a man's voice said, 'This is
ridiculous.' "69
65. Dane County Juror's Handbook at 12 (available through Circuit Court, Dane
County Courthouse, Madison, WI 53709).
66. Id. at 12-13.
67. Notes and Comment, The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Nov. 21, 1984, at
47.
68. Dane County Juror's Handbook, at 13.
69. Wis. St. J., July 7, 1984, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
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The juror's handbook states that only after the trial may
the juror discuss the case with other people, and that the juror
has no obligation to reveal her or his vote or justify the deci-
sion.70 I choose not to discuss the deliberations of this jury for
several reasons. The jury hung- it did not reach a unani-
mous verdict as required in criminal trials. For several
months the case was scheduled to be retried in Dane County.
Ultimately the prosecutor dismissed the case.
Furthermore, I believe there are values that may be served
in keeping closed jury deliberations confidential, except under
compelling circumstances.71 We spoke freely for nine or so
hours. We tested out theories, ideas, arguments. We expected
our conversations to be confined to the room, not to be over-
heard or repeated.
In lieu of discussing our deliberations, I shall comment on
several aspects of the deliberations from my own experiences
as a judge and as a juror, from the perspective of other persons
who have written about their jury experiences, and from the
reported research of lawyers and social scientists on the jury.
First, the subject of our deliberations was typical. It is not
at all unusual for a jury trial to involve what some might call a
minor offense. This case was a misdemeanor theft charge, not
a felony. The judge did not state the punishment, but the stat-
utes provide a maximum penalty of nine months in jail or a
$10,000 fine or both.
The county probably spent more than $1,000 to assemble
the jury and conduct a one-day trial for the alleged theft of a
book worth about $100. None of the jurors complained that
the case was too small for us to handle. I have, however, read
that jurors complain about the cost of the jury and object to
spending valuable time on petty theft cases.72 In contrast,
70. Dane County Juror's Handbook, at 3.
71. For discussions of public disclosures of jury deliberations, see Okun, Investiga-
tion of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 GEO. L.J. 839, 859-64
(1968); Sharp, Postverdict Interrogation of Jurors by the Press: Is the First Amendment
Absolute?, 27 Ras GESTAE 380 (1984); Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations,
96 HARV. L. REv. 886 (1983); Recent Development, Posttrial Juror Interviews by the
Press: The Fifth Circuit's Approach, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 783 (1985); The Juror as Celeb-
rity, TIME, Aug. 16, 1982, at 42.
72. Pileggi, Alice in Juryland, NEW YORK, Mar. 26, 1984, at 47, 58. A textile
company executive was reported as saying that she thought a misdemeanor theft case
should have been handled by a local magistrate.
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Chief Justice Burger7 3 and others suggest that perhaps the
jury should not be used for complex civil litigation. Yet other
commentators suggest that high technology cases are so com-
plex that neither a judge nor jury can master them.74
Just as the subject of the case was typical, so was the pro-
cedure we followed. The jurors' first task was to select a
foreperson to chair the meeting. Jury studies report that the
foreperson is chosen in a number of ways. Often the jurors
select a person willing to serve or the person sitting at the
head of the table-the foreperson's normal seat. According to
the available literature, jurors who know a lawyer or a judge is
among them often turn to that person to serve. Some judges
and lawyers accept the position of foreperson; others decline,
preferring not to take such an active role. I was not the
foreperson.
At one point during our deliberations, the jury wanted
clarification of the instructions relating to intent. Researchers
report that instructions about intent generally cause difficulty
among jurors.7 5 Our foreperson wrote out the question and
73. Burger Suggests Waiving Juries in Complex Civil Trials, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13,
1979, at 21, col. 1.
74. There is an extensive body of literature on juries and complex cases. See, e.g.,
Adler, Complex Cases Call for Blue-Ribbon Juries, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1985, at 20, col.
4; Austin, Why Jurors Don't Heed the Trial, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 15, col. 1;
Campbell, A Historical Basis for Banning Juries, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 17, col. 1;
Demetrio, Should Juries Decide Complex Cases?, TRIAL, Aug. 1985, at 44; Dombroff,
Techniques to Simplify Complex Presentations at Jury Trials, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 6, 1982, at
21, col. 1; Goodman, Greene & Loftus, What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL,
Nov. 1985, at 65; Hawkins, The Case for Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation,
LITIGATION, Fall 1980, at 15; Kuhlman, Pontikes & Stevens, Jury Trial, Progress, &
Democracy 14 J. MAR. L. REv. 679 (1981); Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:
Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981); Margolis & Slavitt, The Case
Against Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, LITIGATION, Fall 1980, at 19;
Nordenburg & Luneburg, Decisionmaking in Complex Federal Civil Cases: Two Alter-
natives to the Traditional Jury, 65 JUDICATURE 420 (1982); Oakes, The Right to Strike
the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 243 (1980);
Rubin, Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Cases: Voice of Liberty or Verdict by Confusion?,
ANNALS, AAPS, July 1982, 87; Sperlich, The Case for Preserving Trial by Jury in Com-
plex Civil Litigation, 65 JUDICATURE 394 (1982); Strawn & Munsterman, Helping Ju-
ries Handle Complex Cases, 65 JUDICATURE 444 (1982); Work, Are Jurors Smart
Enough?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Note, The Case for Special Juries in
Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980).
75. See, e.g., Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend
and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L & Soc'Y REv. 153, 166, 170-71, 175, 180
(1982); Severance, Greene & Loftus, Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors
Can Understand, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 219, 222 (1984).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
gave it to the bailiff, who was seated outside the locked door.
The bailiff returned about a half hour later with a written
message from the judge: the jury should reread the instruc-
tions he had already given US. 7 6
In the hundreds of trial court records I have read as an
appellate court judge, this same scenario is reported often.
Perhaps the judge does not provide additional instructions be-
cause he or she is concerned that an appellate court might rule
that the additional instructions had unduly affected the out-
come of the case. I sympathized with Judge Torphy. He had
a short time to make up his mind. Our court can study a
transcript for several days or weeks and discuss the instruc-
tions at length to decide whether the instructions were
correct.
Although the votes fluctuated we were not able to reach a
unanimous -decision. The juror's handbook explained: "You
should not hesitate to change your opinion, if your reasoning
and judgment have changed, but no juror is required to vote
against personal conscience. The jury should work together
to reach a verdict. ' 77 In their 1966 book entitled The Ameri-
can Jury, Professors Kalven and Zeisel reported that the vote
of the majority on the first ballot usually becomes the result
of the case.78 The jury is hung in less than ten percent of the
cases.
79
At about ten-thirty the foreperson reported to the bailiff
that we had not reached a decision. The bailiff escorted us to
the courtroom where the foreperson announced to those pres-
ent-judge, counsel, and defendant-that we were dead-
locked. The judge asked the foreperson whether she thought
it would do any good to continue trying to reach a decision.
She asked for more time.
We returned to the jury room and deliberated for more
than an hour. Sometime after midnight the foreperson sent a
note to the judge saying the jury was divided ten to two, with-
out identifying the persons on each side and without explain-
76. Wis. STAT. § 805.13(5) (1983-84) allows the court to reinstruct the jury or give
supplementary instructions.
77. Dane County Juror's Handbook, at 13.
78. H. KALVEN JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966).
79. Id. at 56-57, 453, 508-09.
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ing whether the ten were for conviction or acquittal. It had
been a long day and we had done our best. We shook hands
and embraced. We returned to the courtroom. The judge
graciously thanked us. We left in twos and threes. It was
nearly one o'clock in the morning.
We were twelve conscientious, earnest people, twelve
strangers chosen at random from a county of more than
300,000. We had been entrusted with decision making power.
An awesome power-sitting in judgment of another human
being to decide whether the community labels him a thief; to
determine whether he should be deprived of his liberty. Our
deliberations were secret. We needed to report only our final
answer, and we needed to give no reasons for our answer.
When I sit in the supreme court, we do not decide the guilt
of the defendant. We affirm the jury verdict or reverse and
ordinarily order a new trial. As appellate judges our vote is
not secret; it is reported. Furthermore, we must furnish writ-
ten justification for our votes.
Yet, in many ways, the jury's deliberations are like the
conferences in which appellate judges make their decisions.
Both the jury and the appellate court are deliberative bodies;
both are small groups making decisions. Judges, like jurors,
have personal predilections and values. Judges, like jurors,
consider the facts, the legal principles, and the equities. Both
try to use rational arguments to reach and justify their result.
Both groups are subject to psychological mechanisms-
processes by which individual perceptions change when ex-
posed to group discussion. Justice cannot be programmed
into a computer.80
80. For discussions of jury decision making, see, e.g., id.; R. HASTIE, S. PENROD &
N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (reviewed by Loftus & Greene, Book Re-
view, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1984); Sperlich, Book Review, 1984 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 705)); Kessler, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations, in THE JURY
SYSTEM IN AMERICA 67 (R.J. Simon ed. 1975).
For a film of a jury deliberation by University of Wisconsin Law School Professor
Stephen Herzberg, see "Inside the Jury," one of the "Front Line" series produced by
WGBH, Boston Public Television. See Milw. J., Dec. 12, 1985 (Accent Section), at 25,
col. 1.
For discussions of judicial decision making, see, e.g., R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: READINGS, MATERIALS AND CASES, ch. 111 (1976); B. CARDOZO, THE NA-
TURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1976); F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: RE-
FLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH (1980); Hutcheson, The
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "'Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL
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Through its long history, the jury has been condemned
and celebrated.81 The controversy has engaged great names in
law and philosophy-including Hamilton, de Tocqueville,
Blackstone, Montesquieu, Bentham, Wigmore, Pound, Lord
Justice Devlin, Griswold, and Chief Justice Burger.
Critics of the jury stress its lack of predictability, its ineffi-
ciency, and its costs. The advocates assert that our political
system is based on the assumed competence of the common
person to participate in the political process. They see the
jury as a remarkable political institution allowing citizens to
participate actively in the judicial system and to infuse the law
with the community's sense of justice. To the advocates, jus-
tice cannot be measured in dollars; courts should be gauged by
how they dispense justice, not how they dispatch business.
The battle rages in the 1980s.82 At this moment, I am on
the side of the jury. The system works. I've seen it. How-
L.Q. 274 (1929); Neely, A Glimpse into Judges' Chambers, J.D., Dec. 1977, at 33; New-
man, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional
Values, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 200 (1984); Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial
Opinions, 6 CALIF. L. REv. 89 (1918). The reviews of Judge Coffin's book also provide
insight on judicial decision making; see, e.g., Kaplan, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REv.
528 (1981); Oakes, Book Review, 80 MICH L. REv. 579 (1982); Rubin, Book Review, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 220 (1981).
Decision making is not easy. For a discussion of juror trauma, see Kaplan, Death,
So Say We All, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 1985, at 48.
81. For histories of the jury see e.g., L.M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 135-37, 251-53 (1973); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-
350 (1927); J.W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW - THE LAW MAKERS
97, 145, 174-75 (1950); L.E. MOORE, THE JURY (1973); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF
GUILT (1955); Bertoch, The Greeks Had a Juryfor It, 57 A.B.A. J. 1012 (1971); Bloom-
stein, The American Jury System, 60 CURRENT HISTORY 357 (1971); Bodenhamer, The
Democratic Impulse and Legal Change in the Age of Jackson: The Example of Criminal
Juries in Antebellum Indiana, 45 HISTORIAN 206 (1983); Driscoll, The Decline of the
English Jury, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 99 (1979); Hyman & Tarrant, Aspects ofAmerican Trial
Jury History, in The Jury System in America 21 (R. J. Simon ed. 1975); von Moschzis-
ker, The Historic Origin of Trial by Jury, 70 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1921) 73 (1922); Pope,
The Jury, 39 TEx. L. Rlv. 426 (1961); Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil
Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1918); Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5
HARV. L. REv. 249 (1892); Warner, The Development of Trial by Jury, 26 TENN. L.
REv. 459 (1959); Wells, The Origin of the Petty Jury, 27 L.Q. REv. 347 (1911).
82. For a summary of the arguments for and against jury trial and a bibliography
of the literature, see Hearings on Recording of Jury Deliberations Before the Subcom-
mittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., 63-81 (1955); H. KALVEN, JR. & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4, n.2 (1966).
For more recent discussions of jury trial, see, e.g., P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL
(1984); R. J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980); Annual
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ever, like all legal institutions, the jury will continue to
change.
I conclude as I began-with Chesterton's view of the jury:
[T]he instinct of Christian civilization has most wisely
declared that into their judgments there shall upon every oc-
casion be infused fresh blood and fresh thoughts from the
streets. Men shall come in who can see the court and the
crowd, and coarse faces of the policemen and the profes-
sional criminals, the wasted faces of the wastrels, the unreal
faces of the gesticulating counsel, and see it all as one sees a
new picture or a play hitherto unvisited.
Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided,
that determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too
important to be trusted to trained men. It wishes for light
upon that awful matter, it asks men who know no more law
than I know, but who can feel the things I felt in the jury
box. When it wants a library catalogued, or the solar system
discovered, or any trifle of that kind, it uses up its specialists.
But when it wishes anything done which is really serious, it
collects twelve of the ordinary men standing round. The
same thing was done, if I remember right, by the Founder of
Christianity.83
Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advoc. in the United States, The American
Jury System, Final Report (1977); Alonzo & Alonzo, Crossroads for the American Jury
System, S.Q. Oct. 1975, at 21; Corboy, From the Bar, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA 181 (R. J. Simon ed. 1975); Ellsworth, Juries on Trial, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
July 1985, at 44; Freeman, The Jury on Trial, 34 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 65 (1981);
Friloux, Another View from the Bar, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 219 (R. J.
Simon ed. 1975); Graham, From the Press, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 199 (R.
J. Simon ed. 1975); Joiner, From the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 145 (R.
J. Simon ed. 1975); Joseph, The Jury and Judge Frank, 2 GLENDALE L. REV. 293
(1977); Wolf, Trial by Jury: A Sociological Analysis, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 820; Kaufman,
The Verdict on Juries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1984, § 6 (Magazine) at 42, col. 1; Kuhlman,
Pontikes & Stevens, Jury Trial, Progress, and Democracy, 14 MARQ. L. REV. 679
(1981); Watts, From American Literature, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 159 (R. J.
Simon ed. 1975); Wennersten, The Jury Is Out, The Progressive, Dec. 1983, at 14;
Zeisel, Foreword to The American Jury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 1;
Note, The Jury: Is It Viable?, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 897 (1972); Riley, Jury Phobia,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 30, 1985, at S-2, col. 1.
83. G.K. CHESTERTON, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 56-58 (1968).

